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Abstract
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977. It has since become an important factor
in American firms decision-making in acquiring foreign targets, but its economic impact has gone largely
unexamined. I analyze the influence of the risk of an enforcement action under the FCPA on the prices of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA). In a sample of 13,002 CBMA deals by American acquirers
from 1996-2010, I find statistically significant results, suggesting that firms pay on average 3.9 – 5.1% less to
acquire targets in countries with higher risk of attention from the FCPA.
Keywords
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, transnational law, international capital
flows
Cover Page Footnote
I would like to thank Professor Bradley Graham for supervising my research, helping to develop my ideas, and
his critiques.
This article is available in Undergraduate Economic Review: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol12/iss1/13
1. Introduction 
 
In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in response 
to the discovery of the widespread use of bribes by US businesses to foreign 
government officials (Koehler 2012). Under the FCPA, when a firm acquires 
another firm, the acquiring company can be held responsible for any of its 
acquisition’s violations of the FCPA since 1977.  
In my research, I analyze the possible presence of a “risk premium” in 
cross-boarder mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) deals where the target firm is 
located in a country that may face closer scrutiny under the FCPA. If the risk of 
an FCPA action, and the financial and reputational costs associated with it are 
high, an acquiring firm may be willing to pay less for a target firm than if the 
target was located in a country that is unlikely to trigger an FCPA enforcement 
action. Despite the FCPA’s relevance to acquiring firms, this area of interest has 
yet to become a significant area of economic academic research. To my 
knowledge, no work exists that specifically evaluates the possible monetary 
impact of the FCPA on CBMA, although a working paper presents initial results 
that suggest that FCPA enforcement actions are followed by a reduction in the 
volume of CBMA activity in the target country (Graham & Stroup, 2014). This 
paper attempts to further fill that gap.  
I test the hypothesis that the threat of FCPA enforcement leads to lower 
prices in CBMA deals by using data on 13,002 cross-border and domestic 
mergers and acquisitions deals from 1996-2010 by American acquirers as well as 
a data set including information on all FCPA actions since 1977. The results of 
the model estimations support the hypothesis that the risk of an FCPA action 
negatively affects the price of CBMA deals, implying the presence of a risk 
premium.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses background on the 
FCPA and CBMA. Section III presents my empirical methodology, and section 
IV presents the data used to test my hypothesis. Section V analyzes the results of 
the model estimations. Section VI describes additional robustness examinations. 
Finally, Section VII contains my conclusions and points for further analysis.  
 
2. Background & Literature Review  
 
2.1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
In the wake of investigations after the Watergate scandal, the American public 
discovered that American firms routinely participated in bribery while doing 
business abroad. In response to the outcry from this discovery, Congress enacted 
the FCPA in 1977 to promote a higher ethical standard in global business (Kohler, 
2012). The FCPA contains both anti-bribery and record keeping requirements, 
therefore the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) both take responsibility for enforcing the FCPA. The anti-
bribery provision of the FCPA “prohibits the corrupt payment of money or 
‘anything of value’ to a ‘foreign official’ in order to ‘obtain or retain business’” 
(Koehler, 2012). Although the law is now over 35 years old, in recent years, the 
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 FCPA has seen a significant increase in the number of cases prosecuted. In fact, 
more than 64% of the total number of anti-bribery enforcement actions against 
publicly traded companies since 1977 has occurred within the last 10 years 
(Karpoff et al., 2014).  
Early research on the FCPA focused on its impact on the competitiveness of 
American businesses (Hines, 1995). However, recently, research surrounding the 
FCPA has focused on the determinants and magnitude of FCPA enforcement 
actions pursued by the DOJ and SEC. Researchers have identified variables such 
as the involvement of foreign actors, defendant’s country of origin, conditions in 
the bribe-recipient country, corruption levels, and amount of foreign direct 
investment to be influential in the final judgment of an FCPA action beyond 
solely the egregiousness of the infraction (Choi & Davis, 2012; McLean, 2012).  
 
2.2 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions  
For firms, the FCPA has the potential to be an important consideration in their 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) decisions. Under the law, when a 
firm acquires another firm, the acquiring company can be held responsible for any 
of its acquisition’s violations of the FCPA since 1977. Thus, more rigorous due 
diligence in vetting a potential acquisition has become commonplace for firms 
looking to avoid the heavy financial and reputational costs of an FCPA action 
(Karkoff et al., 2009). CBMA activity has been increasing since the 1990s and in 
2007 was valued at USD 4.4 trillion.1 With significant capital at stake, the impact 
of FCPA actions deserves consideration in the evaluation of CBMA deals.   
Legal researchers have studied how FCPA violations relate to CBMA, 
although without attempting to estimate economic relationships. For instance, 
Lindsey (2009) provides a summary of FCPA cases. In the Lockheed Martin and 
Titan merger case, the revelation of violations of the FCPA during pre-merger 
due-diligence eventually led to the termination of the deal. In the case of Latin 
Node and eLandia, Latin Node discovered violations of the FCPA by their 
acquisition post-merger. They self-reported the case to the DOJ and paid a 
criminal fine of $2 million. The high financial and reputational burdens to an 
acquiring firm from an inadvertent violation of the FCPA further support the 
possible presence of a risk premium in acquiring high risk targets.  
 
3. Methodology 
To model the impact of the risk of an FCPA action on CBMA prices, my main 
theoretical model is a relationship of the form: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∝  +𝛽𝐹𝑅 𝑗𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                            (1) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the price of a CBMA deal of the target firm i headquartered in 
country j in year t and 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 represents the perceived risk of an FCPA action in 
                                                        
1 Hall, J., 2007,U.S. Mergers Hit New Record, but Lag Europe, INTLHERALDTRIB., 
www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2007/12/20/business/OUKBSUK-MERGERS-US.php. 
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 country j in year t. I expect that in countries with a higher risk of a FCPA action, 
the price of the deals will be lower to account for the added risk.  
Since perceived risk in unobservable, I measure it using a set of related 
variables.  The main estimating equation is an OLS regression of the form: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2𝐶𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (2) 
 
where 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡  is a measure of FPCA actions in country j by year t. 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is a measure 
of corruption in country j in year t, and I account for additional factors that may 
influence CBMA deal prices with the inclusion of variable 𝑋𝑗𝑡, a vector of macro-
country controls for country j in year t. 
The risk of FCPA action is comprised of two components: risk of 
prosecution by the DOJ or SEC and actual risk of violating the FCPA. Countries 
where the cases of FCPA violations have previously been prosecuted will be 
under closer scrutiny by the DOJ and SEC, therefore I include 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡  to account for 
this added focus. Target firms in countries with higher corruption are at higher 
risk of actually violating the FCPA. The addition of the corruption variable thus 
accounts for the chance of actually violating the FCPA. Furthermore, economic 
research on corruption finds a negative relationship between CBMA prices and 
corruption (Weitzel & Burns, 2006). 
I first account for variables that influence the decision to pursue FCPA 
actions. An FCPA action represents the decision of the DOJ and/or SEC to pursue 
an action against a firm, and thus may include decision-making factors beyond 
whether a violation occurred. As demonstrated in the research of Choi et al. 
(2012) and McClean (2012) the punishment from the DOJ and/or SEC involves 
other possible political and economic factors beyond simply the egregiousness of 
a crime. For instance, the United States might have political motivations in 
discouraging American businesses from moving to China, and thus be more likely 
to prosecute FCPA violations by target firms in that country.2 Or, as Choi et al 
(2012) suggests, the presence of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) can 
lead to higher prosecution rates and fines because the foreign country is willing to 
reveal more information to the United States’ DOJ or SEC during the 
investigation. I account for this endogeneity issue in prosecution choice by 
including control variables in my equations that cover potential economic and 
political factors.  
To further control for endogeneity, I control for factors that influence 
CBMA decisions. Two main motivations for CBMA are 1) efficiency gains from 
attaining economies of scale and 2) strategic gains from improving competitive 
positioning (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). Addressing this second point, acquiring 
firms may look to emerging markets that offer untapped consumer markets and 
high economic growth rates; these same emerging markets may be more corrupt 
and more likely to violate the FCPA. I thus include controls that account for 
economic market factors.  
                                                        
2 China leads all other nations in number of in FCPA violations within their borders with 30.  
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 Additionally, trade costs associated with CBMA can impact prices (Hijzen 
et al., 2006; Shimizu et al., 2004). Cultural and geographic differences make 
successful CBMAs more difficult because firms must overcome language, 
cultural, and physical barriers in addition to the already difficult process of 
merging the personnel and functions of two unique firms. I thus include trade cost 
factors in my controls.  
  
4. Data 
Table I reports descriptions, units, and source of all data. CBMA data comes from 
Bloomberg and includes 13,002 domestic and cross-border mergers and 
acquisition deals announced between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2010 
with a U.S. based acquirer to 133 target countries. The deal prices will be 
represented by the listed announced total deal values. In my regressions, I use log 
of announced total deal values.  I index announced total values into current US 
dollars using the consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
A review of the CBMA data reveals several deals that involve multiple 
target countries, and in order to isolate the impact of the FCPA risk and country 
factors, I remove these 63 deals from the data set. Additionally, I drop deals with 
announced total deal values of zero. When investigated, some of these deals 
possess actual deal values not equal to zero and others’ actual deal values remain 
undisclosed. In order to remain consistent, I remove these deals. Finally, I drop 
deals with missing announced deal values. I also drop deals that occurred in 
territories and dependencies such as the British Virgin Islands and Guernsey. This 
leaves me with a sample of 6902 deals for my estimations.  
To measure FCPA risk, I use data on FCPA actions since 1977 used in 
Graham and Stroup (2014) and assembled from the DOJ/SEC case releases. It 
includes 256 actions in 69 countries. The FCPA variable was added as a count 
variable totaling all FCPA actions in the country up to the year of the deal. 
 To measure corruption, I employ the Control of Corruption Indicator 
(CCI) compiled by the World Bank. The index covers the years 1996-2010 and 
includes indicators for 214 countries. The CCI index is scaled from -2.5 to 2.5 
with 2.5 being the strongest control of corruption and -2.5 the lowest.  
As described in the previous section, to control for country-level 
variations that may impact FCPA enforcement and CBMA prices, I include 
variables to cover economic conditions and trade costs. Economic indicators 
tested include Growth Rate per year from the World Bank and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), GDP per capita, and population from the gravity data set of the 
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). I account 
for possible trade costs with geographic, cultural, and political closeness 
measures. Geographic distance is measured by time difference between the US 
and the target country from the CEPII gravity data set. I approximate cultural 
closeness with the common legal structure and common language gravity 
variables from CEPII.  
Finally, I use proxies for degree of political alignment including 
membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from the 
gravity dataset from CEPII, Mutual Legal Assistant Treaties (MLAT) with the 
4
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 12 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol12/iss1/13
 United States, which I compile by hand from lists of treaties on the Library of 
Congress’ THOMAS website, and a presence of a Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTA) with the United States, which I also compile by hand from the World 
Trade Organization’s list of regional trade agreements. In line with Choi et al. 
(2012), I predict that the presence of a MLAT will result in an increase in the risk 
premium for firms. The presence of a GATT or an RTA should result in increased 
prices because they reduce other trade barriers making targets in member 
countries more attraction.  
 
5. Empirical Results  
Table II presents the results from the estimation of equation (2). Column (1) 
reports estimations of the equation without additional controls and Column (2) 
adds year fixed-effects. The coefficient of interest for FCPA is negative and 
significant as hypothesized. Column (3) and (4) add the controls described in 
Section III. Column (3) uses Common Official Language to proxy for the trade 
cost of cultural closeness and Column (4) uses Common Legal Origin. The 
coefficient of FCPA remains negative and significant. Based on the regressions 
including controls, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that for each added 
action in a target country, and thus added risk of prosecution, the announced price 
of the deal will be on average 3.9 - 5.1% less. The reported prices are only for 
deals that were completed. Deals that did not go through because they were 
deemed too risky are not represented in the data. The omission of these data 
points bias the results downward because they would have represented deals with 
higher risk premiums and thus lower prices. The coefficient on the Control of 
Corruption Indicator is positive and significant, confirming the results of Weizel 
& Burns (2006). Countries with a better Control of Corruption see higher deal 
prices on average.  
Consistent with the proposed motivations for strategic gains through CBMA 
described by Coeurdacier et al., (2009), GDP has a significant positive 
coefficient; consistent with the theory the firms use CBMA to gain market share 
in thriving markets. The coefficient of GDP Growth Rate is negative but 
insignificant possibly suggesting that firms will pay less to acquire firms in 
emerging markets with high growth but also high investment risk.  
Time Difference, which accounts for trade costs associated with geographic 
distance, has a significant positive coefficient. This is in contrast to the trade cost 
theory presented by Hijzen et al. (2006) and Shimizu et al. (2004). When taking 
the log of time difference to account for this possible distribution, the coefficient 
of time difference remains positive but is no longer significant. This regression is 
not shown.  
 Also contrary to trade cost theory, the proxies for cultural closeness, 
common legal origin and common official language are both negative although 
only having a common legal origin is significant. Finally, none of the proxies for 
political closeness, MLAT, RTA, or GATT membership, are significant. These 
variables are also highly correlated, so I only include the MLAT variable. This 
variable coefficient has a negative sign, corresponding with the research in Choi 
et al. (2012).  
5
Duncombe: The FCPA and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015
  I use clustered errors grouped by country in my estimation. I have a 
clustering issue in my regression estimation since I examine CBMA using data at 
the firm level and my explanatory variables only use country level data. Target 
firms may display within country correlations that would not be accounted for in 
my current model. By adding clustered errors, I account for the group-level error 
component. 
 
6. Additional Examinations 
 
6.1 Termination Rate 
 
6.1.1 Background and Model 
In 2003, Lockheed Martin & Titan announced that they would merge, however, 
revelation of violations of the FCPA by Titan during post-announcement due 
diligence resulted in the termination of the merger.  Based on the case of 
Lockheed Martin & Titan, I investigate whether a higher risk of FCPA action 
impacts the likelihood of an announced deal terminating before its completion.  
 To test the effect of FCPA action risk on termination rate, I use a Probit 
model: 
 
𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2𝐶𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (3) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 takes on a unit value if the deal of target firm i located in country j in 
year t is terminated after the announcement,  𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 is a measure FPCA action risk 
in country j in year t. 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is a measure of actual corruption in country j in year t, 
and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of macro-country controls for country j in year t. FCPA risk 
factors should positively correlate with terminated deals.  
 With a Probit model, clustered errors are not possible, so to add validation 
I also run an OLS regression of the form:  
 
𝑇𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2𝐶𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (4) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the termination rate of deals in country j in year t. 
 
6.1.2 Results  
Table III shows results for equations (3) and (4). Column (1) reports the Probit 
estimation without controls, and Column (2) adds controls. Column (3) reports the 
OLS estimation without controls, and Column (4) adds controls. Examining the 
Probit regression, when controls are added, the estimated FCPA coefficient is 
negative. This is in contrast to my expectations that an increased risk of FCPA 
violation will lead to a higher chance of termination. However, the estimated 
coefficient is insignificant. The Control of Corruption estimated coefficient is 
positive as hypothesized although it is also insignificant. The OLS estimation 
showcases similar relationships in the coefficients.  
GDP Growth Rate has a significant positive estimated coefficient 
suggesting that deals in target countries with higher growth, usually more volatile 
6
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 12 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol12/iss1/13
 markets, are more likely to be terminated after the announcement. This estimated 
coefficient becomes insignificant in OLS, but holds the same relationship. 
In support of trade cost theory, common official language has a positive 
estimated coefficient in both the Probit and OLS estimations although it is only 
significant with OLS.  Contrary to trade cost theory, geographic distance, as 
measured by time difference, has a significant negative estimated coefficient 
suggesting that deals between firms that are further apart are less likely to be 
terminated. OLS shows a similar relationship between distance and termination. 
In these cases more rigorous pre-merger diligence may be done to address 
compatibility. Or, geographic closeness could mean that the acquirer discovers 
more information about the target firm post-announcement that results in a 
termination of the deal. The MLAT variable is insignificant in both models.  
 
6.2 Industry Impacts 
 
6.2.1 Background and Model 
Hijzen et al. (2006) distinguish empirically between horizontal (firms in the same 
industries) and vertical (firms in different industries) deal prices. Their research 
suggests the need to examine the impact of firm and industry characteristics on 
CBMA prices. To test this theory, my new model specification adopts equation 
(2) and adds firm characteristics and industry variables:  
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2𝐶𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡+𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (5) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the price of  a deal of target firm i  located in country j in year t,  
𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 is a measure FPCA action risk in country j in year t. 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is a measure of 
actual corruption in country j in year t,  and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of macro-country 
controls for country j in year. 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents firm characteristics of acquirer and 
target firms in deal i of with the target located in country j in year t. 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents 
the industry of the target and acquirer firm in deal i with the target located in 
country j in year t.  
To control for firm characteristics, I include a variable of target firm size; 
larger targets will command higher prices. Data on firm characteristics comes 
from Bloomberg. I use log of acquirer and target total assets and log of acquirer 
and target number of employees to control for firm size. I index announced total 
values, acquirer total assets, and target total assets data into current dollars using 
the consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 I include industry data in two ways. First, I control for horizontal deals 
(acquirer and vertical deals as suggested by Hijzen et al. (2006). I expect 
horizontal deals to correlate with higher prices because more knowledge of the 
industry leads to less risk and a higher chance of success. Second, I group deals 
by interaction level of the target firm industry with government. Industries with a 
high-level of government interaction present a higher risk for FCPA violations 
than medium and low chance of interaction industries because these businesses 
may have a higher necessity for bribery to successfully carry out their business. 
Based on industry data from Bloomberg, I categorize industries with a high 
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 chance of interaction industry sectors to include basic materials, energy, 
Government, and utilities. Under a medium chance of interaction industry sectors 
are communications, financial, and funds. Finally, I categorize low chances of 
government interaction industries as consumer, cyclical and non-cyclical, 
industrial, and technology sectors.  
 
6.2.2 Results 
Table IV shows results for equation (5). Column (1) reports estimates for the 
controls used in my main regression. Column (2) adds a dummy if the target and 
acquiring firm are in the same industry. Column (3) adds dummies for level of 
government interaction. Column (4) includes controls for target size. Column (5) 
includes all industry controls.  
 The estimated coefficient for FCPA actions is negative for all regressions 
although it loses significance with the addition of target size controls. The 
estimated coefficient of Control of Corruption remains positive but loses 
significance with the addition of industry variables.  
 When added to the main regression equation individually, all industry 
controls have significant estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficient for 
horizontal deals is positive supporting the research of Hijzen et al. (2006). The 
estimated coefficients for target firm size controls are both significant and 
positive supporting the hypothesis that larger firms attract higher prices.  These 
coefficients remain significant when all industry controls are added to the model. 
The high and medium government interaction dummies both have positive 
estimated coefficients. This may suggest that acquirers are willing to pay more for 
firms that already interact with government in order to navigate more complicated 
bureaucracies, which may also include navigating corruption.  
 The other controls remain consistent with the main estimated equation; 
however with the addition of target size controls the sign of GDP’s estimated 
coefficient changes and becomes insignificant. 
 
6.3 Governance 
 
6.3.1 Background and Model 
Rossi & Volpin (2004) demonstrate a positive relationship between CBMA and 
governance factors such as accounting standards. Based on their research, it 
makes sense to account for governance in my regressions. However, corruption is 
a component of governance; countries with better governance can also expect 
lower corruption levels. Therefore, I don’t include both variables in my main 
regression. I thus create a separate model to test influence of governance on the 
prices of CBMA: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑗𝑡+𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (6) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the price of the deal with target firm i  located in country j in year t, 
𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 is a measure FPCA action risk in country j in year t. 𝐺𝑗𝑡 is a measure of 
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 Governance in country j in year t,  and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of macro-country controls 
for country j in year t. 
Graham & Stroup (2014) use the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness 
Indicator (GEI) as their proxy for corruption, and based on their research I also 
use the GEI as a proxy for governance. The index covers the years 1996-2010 and 
includes indicators for 215 countries. The GEI is on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 with -
2.5 being the poorest governance and 2.5 being the strongest. The CCI and GEI 
have a very high correlation further demonstrating the necessity of evaluating 
each component separately.  
 
6.3.2 Results 
Table V shows results for the estimation of equation (6). As in the estimation of 
the main equation (2), Column (1) reports estimations of the equation without 
controls and Column (2) adds year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest for 
FCPA is negative and significant as hypothesizes. Column (3) and (4) add the 
controls described in Section III. Column (3) uses Common Official Language to 
proxy for the trade cost of cultural closeness and Column (4) uses Common Legal 
Origin. Examining, Column 4, the coefficient of FCPA actions remains negative 
and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that for each added 
action in a target country, and thus added risk of prosecution, the announced price 
of the deal will be on average 5.57% less.  
The estimated coefficient for governance is positive and significant, matching 
the result of the control of corruption proxy in the estimation of equation (2). The 
coefficients also have similar magnitudes although those for governance are 
slightly lower when controls are added. The sign and significance of the controls 
also match those in the estimation of equation (2). I again use clustered errors 
grouped by country in my estimation.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This research paper attempted to analyze the impact of the risk of FCPA 
enforcement on CBMA prices and termination rates. The OLS estimation 
techniques employed in my main analysis reveal a clear negative impact of FCPA 
risk on deal value and support my initial hypothesis that firms pay lower prices, 
up to 5.1% less, in deals with a higher risk of eventual FCPA enforcement action 
in order to negate this risk.  
 Legal researchers have focused on the impact of the FCPA on firms in 
CBMA deals, but this article represents the first attempt to quantify these impacts. 
The presence of a possible risk premium in CBMA deals with a higher threat of 
violating the FCPA offers a first step in examining the law’s influence on US 
firms. Further examinations could continue to examine the role of a firm’s 
industry in interactions with the FCPA. This research is limited by its examination 
deals with a United States based acquirer. FCPA actions have been filed against 
foreign firms as well, and an expansion of the study could highlight if a risk 
premium applies to these foreign firms. The FCPA was created to set a standard 
in global business; so foreign firms would also have to be examined to truly 
evaluate the success of its mission. 
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9.   Tables 
Table I: List of Data Descriptions and Sources 
Variable  Description Source 
Main Regression 
Deal Value Logged, millions of USD, adjusted 
for inflation 
Bloomberg 
FCPA Actions Count for every FCPA action in 
country up to and including that year 
Graham et al.  
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 Control of Corruption  Scale from -2.5 (low control) to 2.5 
(high control) 
World Bank [1] 
Population Of target country, in millions Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales 
(CEPII) [2] 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Of target country, in current million 
USD 
CEPII [2] 
GDP per capita Of target country, in current USD CEPII [2] 
GDP Growth Rate Of targer country, percentage World Bank [3]  
Time Difference Time in target – time in acquirer CEPII [2] 
General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT) Membership 
1=GATT/WTO membership CEPII [2] 
Regional Trade Agreement w/US 1=membership World Trade Organization (WTO) 
[4] 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 1=presence of treaty Library of Congress THOMAS [5] 
Common Official Language 1=common official or primary 
language 
CEPII [2] 
Common Legal Origins 1=common legal origins CEPII [2] 
Alternative Regressions 
Termination Rate = Terminated deals in target country 
 over total deals in target country (%) 
Bloomberg 
Government Effectiveness 1=lowest quartile of Government 
Effectiveness 
World Bank [1] 
Acquirer Number of Employees Standard units Bloomberg 
Target Number of Employees Standard units  Bloomberg 
 
Acquirer Total Assets Millions of USD, adjusted for CPI Bloomberg 
Target Total Assets Millions of USD, adjusted for CPI Bloomberg 
High Interaction with Government 
Industry 
Target Firm in basic materials, 
government, utilities, or energy 
sectors 
Bloomberg 
Medium Interaction with 
Government Industry 
Target Firm in communications, 
financial, or funds sectors 
Bloomberg 
Low Interaction with Government 
Industry 
Target Firm in consumer, cyclical 
and non-cyclical, industrial, or 
technology sectors 
Bloomberg 
Same Industry 1 = Target and Acquirer firms in 
same industry sector 
Bloomberg 
Footnotes: [1] http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home                                           
[2] http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8   
[3] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
[5] http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx 
[6] http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II: OLS of CBMA Deal Price on FCPA Risk with Corruption Proxy 
The table reports estimates of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Log of Price 
of CBMA deal of target firm i in country j in year t. The variable of interest is FCPA risk 
measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Control of Corruption (CCI) in country j 
in year t (Column (1)). In Column (2), I add year fixed effects. In Column (3) and (4) I add the 
control variables described in Section III, I control for Corruption, Target Country Market 
Potential, and Trade Costs. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the 
coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
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 levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FCPA -0.0431*** -0.0385*** -0.0391** -0.0507*** 
 (0.00826) (0.00807) (0.0186) (0.0185) 
CCI 0.211* 0.230** 0.277*** 0.285*** 
 (0.114) (0.116) (0.0953) (0.0902) 
GDP Growth Rate   -0.0397 -0.0159 
   (0.0465) (0.0436) 
Log GDP   0.100* 0.131** 
   (0.0541) (0.0533) 
Time Difference   0.0693** 0.0548 
   (0.0306) (0.0348) 
Common Official 
Language 
  -0.175  
  (0.137)  
Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty 
  -0.00218 -0.0398 
  (0.136) (0.158) 
Common legal 
Origin 
   -0.307* 
    (0.170) 
     
Observations 5,941 5,941 3,693 3,693 
R-squared 0.034 0.056 0.074 0.075 
Year FE no yes yes yes 
Adj R2 0.0333 0.0541 0.0705 0.0715 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III: Probit Model of Termination on FCPA Risk 
The table reports estimates of Probit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator 
variable for the termination of CBMA deal of firm i in country j in year t taking a value of one if 
a deal was terminated after the announcement and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is 
FCPA risk measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Control of Corruption in 
country j in year t (Column (1)). In Column (2), I add the control variables described in Section 
III, I control for FCPA action factors, Target Country Market Potential, and Trade Costs. In 
Column (3) and (4), I run the same regressions listed above using an OLS estimation technique 
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 with year fixed effects. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the coefficient 
estimates for Column (1) and (2) and clustered standard errors for (3) and (4). *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FCPA 0.00449 -0.00367 0.000260 0.000672 
 (0.00600) (0.0116) (0.000459) (0.000886) 
Corruption 0.0141 0.0710 0.00207 0.00488 
 (0.0476) (0.0756) (0.00568) (0.00589) 
GDP Growth Rate  0.0421*  0.00204 
  (0.0218)  (0.00204) 
Log GDP  -0.0625  -0.00435 
  (0.0442)  (0.00272) 
Time Difference  -0.0404**  -0.00385*** 
  (0.0188)  (0.000962) 
Common Official 
Language 
 0.0427  0.0130** 
  (0.187)  (0.00628) 
Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty 
 -0.154  0.00206 
 (0.147)  (0.00683) 
     
Observations 11,576 6,815 11,576 6,815 
R-squared   0.007 0.013 
Year FE no no yes yes 
Adj R2   0.00539 0.0107 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV: OLS Regression CBMA Price on FCPA with Industry Controls 
The table reports estimates of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Log of Price 
of CBMA deal of target firm i in country j in year t. The variable of interest is FCPA risk 
measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Corruption in country j in year t. In 
Column (1), I add the control variables described in Section III, I control for Target Country 
Market Potential, and Trade Costs. In Column (2), I add a dummy for horizontal deals. In 
Column (3), I add Industry Risk dummies. In Column (4), I add Target Size controls. In Column 
(5), I include all Industry controls. I add year fixed effects in all regressions. Robust standard 
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 errors appear in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
FCPA -0.0391** -0.0490*** -0.0491*** -0.0696 -0.0535 
 (0.0186) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0624) (0.0669) 
Corruption 0.277*** 0.142 0.154 0.113 0.00403 
 (0.0953) (0.0927) (0.0978) (0.184) (0.229) 
GDP Growth 
Rate 
-0.0397 -0.0335 -0.0412 -0.0507 -0.0920 
 (0.0465) (0.0383) (0.0402) (0.0793) (0.106) 
Log GDP 0.100* 0.107** 0.108** -0.121 -0.153 
 (0.0541) (0.0504) (0.0522) (0.0881) (0.125) 
Time Difference 0.0693** 0.0585*** 0.0683*** 0.0137 -0.0253 
 (0.0306) (0.0192) (0.0201) (0.0414) (0.0532) 
Common Official 
Language 
-0.175 -0.00578 -0.0576 0.327 0.339 
(0.137) (0.134) (0.137) (0.231) (0.304) 
Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty 
-0.00218 -0.0329 -0.0523 0.148 0.337 
(0.136) (0.135) (0.140) (0.247) (0.288) 
High Risk 
Industry 
  0.746***  0.424 
   (0.154)  (0.380) 
Medium Risk 
Industry 
  0.227*  -0.0525 
  (0.124)  (0.256) 
Horizontal Deal  0.545***   0.198 
  (0.104)   (0.223) 
Log Target Total 
Assets 
   0.542*** 0.469*** 
   (0.0783) (0.0847) 
Log Target No. 
of Employees 
   0.118* 0.142* 
   (0.0693) (0.0800) 
      
Observations 3,693 2,046 1,979 372 274 
R-squared 0.074 0.099 0.100 0.470 0.483 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Adj R2 0.0705 0.0923 0.0931 0.446 0.445 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table V: OLS of Price on FCPA Risk with Governance Proxy 
The table reports estimates of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Log of Price 
of CBMA deal of target firm i in country j in year t. The variable of interest is FCPA risk 
measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Governance in country j in year t 
(Column (1)). In Column (2), I add year fixed effects. In Column (3) and (4) I add the control 
variables described in Section III, I control for Target Country Market Potential, and Trade 
Costs. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FCPA -0.0443*** -0.0423*** -0.0462** -0.0557*** 
 (0.00680) (0.00666) (0.0178) (0.0175) 
Governance 0.271** 0.254* 0.218* 0.232** 
 (0.136) (0.132) (0.116) (0.111) 
GDP Growth Rate   -0.0491 -0.0281 
   (0.0421) (0.0404) 
Log GDP   0.113* 0.133** 
   (0.0578) (0.0540) 
Time Difference   0.0718** 0.0602* 
   (0.0299) (0.0343) 
Common Official 
Language 
  -0.101  
  (0.147)  
Common legal 
Origin 
   -0.236 
    (0.189) 
Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty 
  -0.0167 -0.0300 
  (0.132) (0.151) 
     
     
Observations 5,941 5,941 3,693 3,693 
R-squared 0.034 0.055 0.072 0.072 
Year FE no yes yes yes 
Adj R2 0.0335 0.0533 0.0682 0.0689 
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